The idea that the concept 'knowledge' has a distinctive function or social role is increasingly influential within contemporary epistemology. Perhaps the best-known account of the function of 'knowledge' is that developed in Edward Craig's Knowledge and the state of nature (1990, OUP), on which (roughly) 'knowledge' has the function of identifying good informants.
sketch, in rough outline, Craig's methodology ( §1; §2.3). Second, I will argue that, understood along the lines of the genealogical interpretation, the function of 'knowledge' supports a certain sort of epistemic contextualism ( §2.1-2.3).
In broad outline, the idea to be defended is that talk of the function of a concept concerns longstanding and extensive patterns of use within a linguistic community. But the way in which a concept (and the word it expresses) is used over a long period of time within a linguistic community shapes and informs the conditions under which the concept applies, and the meaning of the word it expresses. Consequently, the function of a concept is relevant to semantics. 
Motivations
Craig adverts to three motivations (1990: 1-2) . First, as demonstrated by the post-Gettier literature, providing a successful analysis of 'knowledge' isn't easy (for an overview see Ichikawa & Steup 2012) . If an alternative is available, why not give it a go? Second, intuitions about whether subjects in imagined cases know provide the data for an analysis of 'knowledge'. Call these 'extensional intuitions' (intuitions about the extension of the concept 'knowledge'). But we also have 'intensional intuitions' (intuitions about the conditions that must be satisfied for the concept to apply). Sceptics argue that the two don't mesh: the intuitive intension of 'knowledge' because others often have the information that we need and are willing to share it, we have a concept with the function of identifying good informants.
The procedure here involves three steps. First, we identify something that humans, both now and at all points in their development, need. Humans, both now and at all points in their development, need information about the world, and because they can't get all of that information themselves they need a way of identifying those who have it. 4 That humans have these needs is, in some sense, contingent. If we were omniscient, we'd have all the information that we need at our fingertips. Second, we ask what meets our need for a way of identifying those who have information, and Craig's hypothesis is that the concept 'knowledge' does. Third,
given that 'knowledge' meets this need, we identify the conditions we would have to put on the concept in order for it to meet it. To identify someone as a 'knower' is to identify her as a good
informant, so what is required to be a good informant?
The following captures the conditions one would have to meet to be a good informant for the rest of one's small group (cf. Craig 1990: 84-5):
GOOD INFORMANT: Roughly, a good informant about p is someone who:
i. Tells the truth about p (i.e. either p and she believes that p, or not-p and she believes that not-p).
ii. Is as likely to be right about p as the interests and purposes of her group require.
iii. Is detectable by the others in her group as likely enough right.
iv. Is immediately available to the others in her group.
An example: Otto is sitting on a hill and scanning the horizon for a sight of our enemy. Otto has good eyesight, a well-known good track record as a lookout and can shout loud enough for those in his group to hear. Assuming Otto is telling the truth when he shouts that the enemy is coming, he's a good informant as to whether the enemy is coming.
However, we don't identify good informants in a social vacuum. When I identify a subject as a good informant, I don't just recommend that subject as an informant to the others in my group, I recommend her to the 'world at large'. An epistemic evaluation is a public property. Others who are not in my group, and who have interests and purposes I'm not even aware of, can and will draw on my epistemic evaluation. These sorts of social pressures mean that we need to remove the 'subjective' conditions (iii-iv), and we need to remove the reference to the interests and purposes of some particular group (ii). This gives us the following (cf. Craig 1990: 88-9):
GOOD INFORMANT*: Roughly, a good informant about p is someone who:
i. Tells the truth about p.
ii. Is as likely to be right about p as the interests and purposes of her community require.
In Craig's view, GOOD INFORMANT corresponds to what was required to be a good informant at an earlier stage of the development of the concept 'knowledge' whereas GOOD INFORMANT* corresponds to what is required at this later stage in its development (1990: Chapter 10) . So, an
exploration of 'what a concept with that function would look like' gives us a picture of how the conditions one must meet to be a good informant, and so to 'know', will have developed through social pressures.
The end result
Why does this tell us anything about our concept rather than some other concept? Here's Craig:
"[I]t is not the idea to construct an imaginary concept, but to illuminate the one we actually have, though it be vague or even inconsistent; and to illuminate it by showing that a concept with the hypothesised role would have characteristics closely resembling those that it exhibits itself. But should our intuitions prove indeterminate or elastic, this type of investigation might reveal constructive ways of stretching them, and the rationale behind the stretch" (1990: 2-3).
So Craig gives us a reconstruction of our concept 'knowledge', where the reconstruction gives conditions one must meet to be a good informant, and so to 'know', such that the conditions (1) ensure that 'knowledge' can perform its distinctive function and (2) don't diverge significantly from its intuitive intension and extension (see also 1990: 5, 8, 13-14, 17) . Assuming Craig's hypothesis about the function of 'knowledge' is right, his reconstruction will achieve (1). (I set aside (2) here, but see Craig 1990: Chapters 2-3, Chapter 10).
I'll refer to the procedure just outlined as 'Craigian genealogy'. As Craig puts it, he is investigating the 'genesis' of the concept 'knowledge ' (1990: 102, 107, 109, 117) . I now turn to the question of how to interpret talk of the 'function' of a concept, and why one might think that the function of 'knowledge' supports epistemic contextualism. in the development of our concept 'knowledge', contextualism is false. I deal with this problem below ( §2.2). I'm going to argue that a rather more sophisticated way of arguing from Craigian genealogy to (a sort of) contextualism is available.
From Craigian genealogy to Craigian contextualism
The second obvious problem: Prima facie, one shouldn't think that the function of 'knowledge'
and 'knowledge' ascriptions tells us much about the correct semantics for 'knowledge' and 'knowledge' ascriptions. Again: The point isn't that the function of a concept or word is irrelevant to semantics, the point is that further investigation is needed to determine whether it's relevant. So, by itself, Craigian genealogy doesn't support contextualism. I also deal with this problem below ( §2.3).
The usual argument, improved
Some preliminaries: First, on the account of Craigian genealogy given earlier the conditions on being a good informant, and so 'knowing', given in GOOD INFORMANT correspond to an early stage of development of the concept 'knowledge' whereas those given in GOOD INFORMANT* correspond to a later stage in its development. Call this the 'standard interpretation'. Second, on the standard interpretation the end result of Craigian genealogy is a sort of invariantism, on which whether one 'knows' that p depends on whether one can rule out a relatively stable range of alternatives in which not-p. As I'll put it below, the idea is that, because of social pressures, for any proposition p our community has settled on a range of alternatives in which not-p that are 'default relevant' (I take this phrase from Hannon Forthcoming). Third, I'll assume that the sorts of alternatives that are default relevant are the sorts of alternatives that subjects in ordinary situations (such as chatting to a friend over lunch) are often able to rule out whereas the subjects in more high stakes situations (such as testifying to the police) often aren't.
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On the standard interpretation, the interests and purposes of the whole community determine the relatively stable range of alternatives in which not-p that one generally has to be able to rule out to count as 'knowing' that p (the default relevant alternatives). This, as I'll put it, makes the default relevant alternatives 'globally interest-relative'. The range of alternatives that are default relevant depends on the interests and purposes of the members of our community (the sorts of practical projects they engage in, the sorts of practical situations they find themselves in Hannah and Sarah, in their particular practical situation, will draw on. Consequently, Hannah should consider the full range of alternatives appropriate to her practical situation, which will be a wider range than are default relevant. Another sort would be a case where, while the 'knowledge' ascriber isn't in an unusually pressing practical situation, she's giving advice to someone who is. Imagine it isn't vitally important that Hannah and Sarah cash their cheque before Monday, but it is vitally important that their friend Lisbeth does so. Again, Hannah's epistemic self-evaluation isn't something that a range of people in various situations can or will draw on. Rather, it's something that Lisbeth, in her particular practical situation, will draw on.
Consequently, Hannah should consider the full range of alternatives appropriate to Lisbeth's practical situation, which again will be wider than the range that is default relevant. Second reason: One can never be certain that one's epistemic evaluation isn't going to be drawn on by some unknown party. Say I'm in a very low stakes practical situation and I'm evaluating whether a subject with rather meagre evidence 'knows' that p. Because I'm in such a low stakes practical situation, I don't consider certain alternatives in which not-p that are default relevant.
Further, say that I'm very confident that my epistemic evaluation isn't something that a range of people in various situations can or will draw on (I think I'm alone). But it could be that, unbeknownst to me, there are people that can and will draw on my evaluation (maybe I'm not alone). I therefore should still consider all of the default relevant alternatives rather than some narrower range. 'Knowledge' ascribers can never be certain that, in taking particular practical situations into account, they aren't providing epistemic evaluations of subjects that may mislead others who draw on those evaluations. and GOOD INFORMANT* as both corresponding to the present day, with GOOD INFORMANT* capturing the conditions one must meet to be a good informant, and so to 'know', in one range of situations (when one is identifying a subject as an authority, when one is offering advice to a diverse group, etc) and GOOD INFORMANT capturing the conditions one must meet in another range of situations (when one is in an unusually pressing practical situation, or offering advice to someone else who is in such a situation). ii. The alternatives that are relevant in a context C are the alternatives that are appropriate given the practical situation of those in C. Often, the alternatives that are appropriate given the practical situation of those in C will just be the default relevant alternatives. However, when those in C are in an unusually pressing practical situation, a wider range of alternatives will be appropriate.
Two things to note: First, Craigian contextualists hold that the range of alternatives that are relevant in a context can be wider but not narrower than those that are default relevant (ii). Of course, the conclusion only follows if we disregard the first problem with the usual argument, which concerns the relevance of the function of the concept 'knowledge' and 'knowledge' ascriptions to semantics. It's to that problem which I now turn.
The genealogical interpretation and semantic relevance
I proceed as follows. First, I diagnose why many will find the claim that one can derive The point isn't that functions are relevant to pragmatics rather than semantics. The point is that, absent further investigation, we can't conclude which a particular function is relevant to. But, if that's right, Craig's account of the function of 'knowledge' doesn't, by itself, support contextualism.
I'll call this way of thinking of claims about the function of 'knowledge' the 'Gricean interpretation'. (The label is ugly, but it will be useful). 
Two interpretations
There are a number of features of the Gricean interpretation that don't seem to fit with Craigian genealogy. First, on the Gricean interpretation claims about the function of 'knowledge' ascriptions concern what particular speakers at particular times may do by using pieces of language. Second, the reasons why particular speakers may use particular pieces of language concern their communicative intentions, their beliefs about their situation and the like. In contrast, Craigian genealogy starts with the identification of a need (for information, and therefore for a way of identifying good informants) that is common to all humans at all stages in our development, and then proceeds to the hypothesis that the concept 'knowledge', in particular 'knowledge' ascriptions, meets that need. So, contra the first feature of the Gricean interpretation, Craig's hypothesis concerns how a community used, and continues to use, certain concepts and words in order to meet a common need. Further, contra the second feature, the focus is on the reasons why a community uses those concepts and words, not particular speakers and their communicative intentions.
On what I'll call the 'genealogical interpretation' (again, an ugly but useful label), Craigian genealogy is concerned with the way in which a community of speakers over a long period of time use and have used certain concepts and pieces of language (sentences of the form 'S knows that p' and 'S doesn't know that p') in order to meet a common need. While, like the Gricean interpretation, the genealogical interpretation appeals to use, it appeals to extensive and longstanding patterns of use within a whole community -where the community comprises those who use the concepts and language, hence a 'linguistic community' -rather than particular uses at particular times. And, for the reasons given, Craigian genealogy is best interpreted along the lines of the genealogical interpretation.
Functions, concepts and use
What is the connection between meaning and use? I distinguish two views: First, the (controversial) view that meaning just is use. On this view, facts about the meanings of our words are facts about how they are used (or, more plausibly, facts about meaning are constituted by some subset of facts about use as in Horwich 1998). Second, the (very plausible) view that the meanings of our words stand in some sort of complicated causal relationship to the way in which they have been used over a period of time. On this view, what a word means is partly a function of how it has been used, but we can't 'read off' facts about meaning from particular uses, and facts about meaning aren't facts about particular uses, use in general, or constituted by some subset of facts about use. Rather, the way in which a word is used over a long period of time will 'shape' the conditions under which the concept it expresses applies. In what follows I assume that the second view is true, but I don't take this to be a controversial assumption.
On the Gricean interpretation, talk about the function of 'knowledge' ascriptions concerns particular uses by particular speakers at particular times. And, as I just pointed out, one can't read off conclusions about the meaning of 'knowledge' and 'knowledge' ascriptions from particular uses at particular times. Consequently, as one would expect, on the Gricean interpretation Craigian genealogy doesn't support Craigian contextualism. But, as I've just argued, Craigian genealogy is best interpreted along the lines of the genealogical interpretation rather than the Gricean interpretation and, on that interpretation, talk about the function of 'knowledge' ascriptions concerns extensive and long-standing patterns of use within a linguistic community. And, as I also just pointed out, what a word means -in the case, 'knowledge' -is partly a function of the way in which it has been used over a period of time within a linguistic community. The way in which a word has been used shapes the conditions under which the concept it expresses applies, so the way in which we've used 'knowledge' shapes the conditions under which 'knowledge' applies. So, on the genealogical interpretation Craigian genealogy is relevant to the semantics as opposed to the pragmatics of 'knowledge' and 'knowledge'
ascriptions. Consequently, Craigian genealogy supports Craigian contextualism.
Strict and sensitive invariantism
Those who are familiar with the intricacies of the contextualism/invariantism debate in epistemology will, at this point, be demanding answers to two questions. First, why does the argument of §2.1-2.3 tell in favour of Craigian contextualism rather than some variety of invariantism? Second why does it tell in favour of Craigian contextualism rather than some other variety of contextualism? (The second question perhaps raises another: What's the difference between Craigian contextualism and other varieties of contextualism?). I sketch an answer to the first question here and an answer to the second (and third) below ( §2.5).
Some preliminaries: First, invariantism is the view that the semantic contents and truth-values of 'knowledge' and 'knowledge' ascriptions don't vary with the context of ascription. Second, we need to distinguish between strict and sensitive invariantism. Strict invariantists hold that only truth-conducive factors, such as the reliability of the subject's belief-forming mechanisms, determine whether the subject knows some true proposition that she believes. In contrast, sensitive invariantists hold that some combination of truth-conducive and non-truth-conducive factors, such as the stakes (for the subject) or what sorts of error-possibilities the subject is considering, determine whether the subject knows some true proposition that she believes (Fantl & McGrath 2009; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005) . Third, contextualists motivate their view by appeal to pairs of cases where in one case an ascriber with seeming propriety claims that a subject 'knows' that p based on certain grounds whereas in the other the same ascriber with seeming propriety denies that the same subject 'knows' that p based on the very same grounds, where the cases differ in the stakes for the ascriber, or the sorts of error-possibilities she is considering. Strict invariantists usually deal with these cases by positing contextual variation in the assertability-conditions (but not truth-conditions) of 'knowledge' ascriptions (Brown 2006; Rysiew 2001) . Fourth, sensitive invariantists agree with contextualists that there are pairs of cases such that in one case a subject knows that p based on certain grounds whereas in the other the same subject doesn't know that p based on the same grounds, but they deny that these are pairs that differ in the stakes for the ascriber, or the sorts of error-possibilities the ascriber is considering. Rather, they are pairs that differ in the stakes for the subject, or the sorts of errorpossibilities the subject is considering. So one of the crucial differences between contextualism and sensitive invariantism concerns the following sort of case:
HIGH-LOW: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit a cheque. Since they have an impending bill, and very little in their account, it's very important that they deposit their cheque by Saturday.
Hannah calls up Bill on her cell phone, and asks Bill whether the bank will be open on Saturday.
Bill replies by telling Hannah, 'Well, I was there two weeks ago on a Saturday, and it was open.'
After reporting the discussion to Sarah, Hannah concludes that, since banks do occasionally change their hours, 'Bill doesn't really know that the bank will be open on Saturday'
Contextualists will say that Hannah speaks truly (Hannah and Sarah are in a high stakes situation)
whereas sensitive invariantists will say that Hannah speaks falsely (Bill is in a perfectly ordinary situation we're inquiring into whether a subject knows we're using that subject as a potential informant.
What Hannah wants to establish is whether, if Bill were in her situation, he would 'know' that p.
Consequently, Hannah requires that Bill rule out alternatives appropriate to her situation, rather than to Bill's.
The projectivist strategy appeals to a particular feature of our epistemological practice -that, in evaluating whether a subject 'knows' that p, we're evaluating that subject as an informant -in order to explain why an ascriber such as Hannah might mistakenly project her situation onto the subject of her 'knowledge' ascription. But, as we've seen, it's plausible that this feature of our practice reveals the function of 'knowledge'. So the defender of the projectivist strategy has to hold that the function or social role of 'knowledge' ascriptions involves some sort of error or mistake. This, I think, is a real cost for anyone who wants to adopt it.
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I also take the argument of §2. But I do take it to show that it's unlikely that what it takes to 'know' is a context-insensitive matter. Third, if the strict invariantist who appeals to a contextual variation in assertabilityconditions is right, then when a 'knowledge' ascriber is in a very high stakes situation she could often, quite truthfully albeit improperly, say that some subject 'knows' that such-and-such. But, in doing so, she could not be identifying that subject as a good informant on the matter of suchand-such (because she wouldn't qualify). The strict invariantist needs to hold that the truth- First, conversational contextualists think of contexts as points along a continuum, with contexts where an extremely wide range of alternatives are relevant at one extreme, and contexts where an extremely narrow range of alternatives are relevant at the other. For any proposition p, the limit at one extreme is just all the alternatives in which not-p and the limit at the other is perhaps just any alternative in which not-p that actually obtains (of course, there may not be such an alternative). The context shifts, and the range of relevant alternatives expands or contracts, according to the conversational kinematics (the raising and taking seriously of error-possibilities etc) (DeRose 2009; Lewis 1996) . Consequently, conversational contextualism has the following two features:
1. There are no constraints on how wide or narrow the range of relevant alternatives can get.
2. Expansions and contractions in the range of alternatives relevant in a context are tied to conversational kinematics. 10 Call the combination of (1) and (2) I conclude that Craigian genealogy doesn't support, and actually rules out, conversational contextualism.
